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ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS BY DIMINISHING PRIVACY:
HOW THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT JEOPARDIZES THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY1
Alberto Cerda Silva2
ABSTRACT
Enforcing the law in the digital environment is one of the main
challenges of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). In
order to enforce the intellectual property law, unlike previous
international agreements on the matter, ACTA attempts to set forth
provisions concerned with privacy and personal data. Special
provisions refer to law enforcement in the digital environment;
ACTA would require the adoption of domestic law to allow
identifying supposed infringers and, consequently, the collaboration
of the online service providers (OSPs) with rights holders. However,
those provisions raise some human rights concerns, particularly as
related to the right to privacy of Internet users and the right to
protection of their personal data.
This paper describes the ACTA provisions on the rights to privacy
and personal data protection and compares them with domestic
privacy law in the context of intellectual property enforcement,
particularly those of the United States (U.S.) and the European Union
(EU). The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that the ACTA
provisions do not harmonize the domestic laws in force, instead it
creates a new standard, beyond any domestic law; the full
implementation of those provisions would require modifications in
the domestic law, which seriously undermines the right to privacy and
1

At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA
was the most recent draft of the text. Any references to “the most recent text” and related
analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft. After this paper was submitted for publication, a
new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010. This paper may be revised by the author
to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text.
2
Professor, University of Chile Law School.
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protection to personal data. Therefore, this paper calls for some
modifications in the current text of ACTA in order to reach an
adequate balance between intellectual property enforcement and the
aforementioned rights to privacy and personal data protection.
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BACKGROUND
Globalization, digitalization, and the Internet have been the main
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challenges for intellectual property since the turn of the century.
Globalization has reduced the cost of transportation and communication
across the world;3 the digitalization of content has facilitated and increased
the flow of copyrightable works;4 and, the Internet, which is the paradigm
of global services, has allowed the cross-border transfer of digital works in
seconds. As a result of those phenomena, creating and maintaining an
adequate protection for intellectual property rights has required several
modifications of the law on the international level, especially in copyright.
International instruments on intellectual property have focused their
efforts on achieving the harmonization of domestic laws by adopting
common standards related to the scope, the rights, the duration, and
limitations of intellectual property rights. However, to some extent, two
issues have been postponed in the international fora: the enforcement of
those rules and its adequacy to the digital environment. These are the main
topics addressed by ACTA with the goal of addressing the counterfeiting
and piracy of goods that affect commercial interests.
This paper analyzes the provisions of ACTA that unsuccessfully attempt
to balance the protection of intellectual property rights and the fundamental
rights of users, especially those related to the right to privacy and the right
to protection of personal data.
ACTA‟S PURPOSES AND PRIVACY PROVISIONS

II.

According to statements of governments that have taken part in the
negotiation of ACTA, the initiative aims to establish international standards
for enforcing intellectual property rights to target more efficiently the
increasing problem of counterfeiting and piracy that significantly affects
commercial interests, rather than the activities of common people.5
However, the analysis of the privacy provisions of ACTA shows a different
3
4

5

JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 27 et seq. (2002).
NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (explaining the inadequacy of
current intellectual property regulation, originally designed to protect analog works,
to protect digital works). The cause of this inadequacy would be the whole difference
between atoms and bits.
See, G8 Toyako Declaration on World Economy, July 8, 2008, ¶ 17, available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/July/20080708102050bpuh0.982113
1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). G8 includes the government of Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See also
Press Release, European Commission, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (April 21,
2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552
(expressing that ACTA‟s purpose is to “address large-scale infringements of
intellectual property rights” and “no means lead to a limitation of civil liberties or to
„harassment‟ of consumers.”).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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concern, and they seem to focus more on enforcing the law against citizens
rather than against criminal organizations and/or serious crime.
The negotiations of ACTA have not taken place in any multilateral fora,
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), but they have involved several countries.
In fact, currently, the negotiations include Australia, Canada, Japan,
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, the
U.S., and the European Union.
From 2008 to August 2010, there have been ten rounds of negotiations,
which have been conducted mainly in secret. Only after enormous pressure
from civil society organizations and the European Parliament6 was there an
official public release of the proposed text of the agreement, after the 8th
round, in April 2010.7 Unfortunately, in spite of the requirement of
transparency, there has not been any new public release of the negotiations.
However, there are leaked versions of the draft of the agreement, one before
and another after the official public release, in January and July 2010,
respectively.8 All those documents permit viewing a mosaic of the progress
during the negotiations, particularly the leaked versions of the agreement,
since they, unlike the official release, include the positions of negotiators by
country and uncensored text of footnotes. Given its high verisimilitude and
updated content, this paper is based on the last consolidated text available
from July 1, 2010; therefore, all the references to the ACTA text here and
elsewhere are to that document, except as otherwise mentioned.
The current text of ACTA is structured in six chapters that include
initial provisions and definitions,9 the proposed legal framework for

6

7

8

9

Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and State of Play of the ACTA
Negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-PROV(2010)0058, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA2010-0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text Prepared for Public Release
Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: April 21, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT
DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official
Consolidated ACTA Text Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010” hyperlink)
[hereinafter ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010]
Before the 7th round, in January 2010, was released the first leaked version of the
agreement. See, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text, Informal
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, January 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan.
18, 2010]. Immediately after the 9th round, in July 2010, was released the second
one. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Consolidated Text, Informal
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, 1 July 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jul. 1,
2010]. All versions, official and leaked, are available at the PIJIP IP Enforcement
Database, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta.
ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, Ch. One: Initial Provisions and
Definitions, arts. 1.1 to 1.X.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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enforcement of intellectual property rights,10 norms about international
cooperation,11 enforcement practices and mechanisms,12 an institutional
arrangement,13 and final provisions related to the effects of the agreement.14
For purpose of this paper, it is necessary to explain with some detail those
norms related to the legal framework for enforcing the law, which includes
provisions on civil liability, border measures, criminal enforcement, and
special measures related to technological enforcement of intellectual
property in the digital environment.
In relation to civil enforcement, ACTA requires parties to have available
civil procedures to enforce rights, including provisions about injunctions,
damages, other remedies, access to information related to infringement and
infringers, and provisional measures.15
The section related to border measures requires the adoption of certain
mechanisms by parties when goods are suspected of infringing intellectual
property rights, except in case of di minimis infringement.16 Those
measures can be adopted under application of the rights holders and also ex
officio.17 Parties shall provide safeguard measures, procedures to determine
infringement and remedies, reasonable enforcement fees, and the disclosure
of information about infringements and infringers.18
Related to criminal enforcement, ACTA attempts to conceptualize
criminal offenses, to extend liability to legal persons and inciting conducts,
and to adopt criteria for penalties and sanctions.19 As to these points, the
draft still shows an important lack of agreement among the different
proposals. ACTA includes provisions about seizure, confiscation/forfeiture,
and destruction of suspected counterfeit (trademark) or pirated (copyright)
goods.20 Finally, ACTA requires parties to allow ex officio criminal
enforcement and to ensure the rights of the defendants and third parties.21
The section about technological enforcement of intellectual property in
the digital environment22 is by far the most innovative of the instrument,
since several of the issues raised by those provisions never have been

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. Ch. Two: Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, arts.
2.X to 2.18.
Id. Ch. Three: International Cooperation, arts. 3.1 to 3.3.
Id. Ch. Four: Enforcement Practices, arts. 4.1 to 4.5.
Id. Ch. Five: Institutional Arrangement, arts. 5.1 to 5.3.
Id. Ch. Six: Final Provisions, arts. 6.1 to 6.7.
Id. arts. 2.1 to 2.5.
Id. art. 2.X.
Id. art. 2.7.
Id. arts. 2.9 to 2.13.
Id. arts. 2.14 and 2.15.
Id. art. 2.16.
Id. art. 2.17.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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regulated in previous international instruments on intellectual property, not
even the WIPO Internet Treaties.23 Basically, this section includes
provisions about the limitation of liability related to online material for
online service providers and the protection for effective technological
measures and rights management information. This section, which seems
drafted as an updated version of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA),24 still shows an evident absence of agreement among the parties.
In fact, by the tenth round of negotiations, almost all the articles are in
brackets, several of them have different proposals, and the section contains
more footnotes than any other.
Different from previous international agreements on intellectual
property, ACTA includes explicit references to privacy and data protection.
Neither the Berne Convention nor the Paris Convention, which are the main
international instruments on copyright and patents, makes any reference to
privacy or data protection. By its part, the TRIPS Agreement only refers to
them indirectly, by allowing WTO members to provide that the judicial
authorities could order the intellectual property infringer to inform the
identity of third persons involved in infringements.25 In addition, the
TRIPS Agreement includes some provisions that raise secrecy and
confidentiality, but they look at commercial, business, and manufacturing
information, not at personal information.26
ACTA calls attention to privacy and data protection in several of its
drafted provisions by: drafting a provision to ensure that nothing in it
detracts from domestic legislation regarding protection of personal
privacy;27 reserving domestic law that regulates processing of personal data,
in accessing or disclosing personal information in civil enforcement 28 and

22
23

24

25

26

27
28

Id. art. 2.18.
The World Intellectual Property Organization adopted both the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty and the Copyright Treaty, also known as the WIPO Internet
Treaties, which provide protection for works in digital environment and regulates the
technological protective measures, on December 20, 1996.
Adopted in 1998, the DMCA amended the U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 of the U.S.
Code, to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties. However, beyond the purpose of
the mentioned treaties, it also included provisions related to limitations on the liability
of online service providers for copyright infringement. See, Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, codified in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C. [hereinafter DMCA].
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], art. 47.
Id. arts. 34 and 39 (referring to secret information). See also id. arts. 40, 42, 43, 57
and 63 (referring to confidential information).
ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 1.4.
Id. art. 2.4.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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border measures;29 implicitly referring to the rights of defendants and third
parties in enforcement;30 excluding the monitoring of user monitoring by
ISPs as a condition to enjoy the limitations on liability relating to material
online;31 requiring ISPs to provide expeditious information on the identity
of subscribers to right holders in claims of copyright or related rights
infringement;32 and adopting privacy as a possible limit to transparency
and/or publication of enforcement procedures and practices.33
As the Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Marc Rotenberg, correctly states, intellectual property rights never have
conferred per se the right to identify users.34 However, because enforcing
intellectual property rights, particularly in the digital environment, requires
identifying supposed infringers, ACTA has been forced to include the
aforementioned provisions about privacy and personal data protection.
They seem intended to balance the competing interests: reaching an
appropriate level of enforcement for intellectual property and, at the same
time, guaranteeing an adequate level of protection for privacy and personal
data. Unlike intellectual property rights, which are “private rights,”35
getting adequate protection for the rights to privacy and personal data is
important not just for individual interests, but also to protect societal values,
because they are essential in the very idea of democracy and as safeguards
of human rights.36
In the following pages, this paper briefly analyzes the main challenges
that the current text of ACTA creates for privacy and data protection,
nascent provisions for an international treaty about intellectual property.
This paper focus mostly on the context of intellectual property enforcement
in the digital environment, but its conclusions may be applied generally to
online and offline activities.
CRITICISMS OF ACTA‟S PRIVACY PROVISIONS

III.

29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36

Id. art. 2.13.
Id. art. 2.X.
Id. art. 2.18.3 bis.
Id. art. 2.18.3 ter.
Id. art. 4.3.
The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Privacy Issues: Hearing on
H.R. 2281Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Int‟l Relations (Jun. 5, 1998) (testimony and statement
of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, Preamble.
See Frances S. Grodzinsky & Herman T. Tavali, P2P Networks and the Verizon v.
RIAA Case: Implications for Personal Privacy and Intellectual Property, 7 ETHICS
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 243 (2005).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Analyzing the current text of ACTA poses some challenges. First, most
of the consolidated text is still in brackets, which means it is under
discussion and there is not an agreement yet. Second, several provisions
present different proposed options, some of them with important
dissimilarities.
Third, while some footnotes clearly evidence the
negotiators‟ intent,37 others seem an authoritative interpretation of the text,38
still others look like they are primarily intended to reserve the agreement‟s
implementation to the domestic law,39 and even a few of them are directly
prescriptive.40 Those facts make it complex to identify the real intent of the
negotiating parties and, therefore, how much of the current draft will be
eventually in the agreement. However, in spite of those difficulties, it is
still possible to attempt an analysis of the provisions of ACTA still under
negotiation.
Probably because the EU has the strongest legal framework for
protecting the rights to privacy and personal data protection, its authorities
have reacted to and criticized the ACTA provisions for failing to provide
adequate protection to those rights. Analyzing, and even describing, the
legal framework to protect privacy and personal data adopted by the EU is
beyond the purpose of this paper. Briefly, it provides a comprehensive
legal regime for processing personal data related to physical persons, by
automatic or manual process, for the public and private sectors. In the
communitarian level, this framework includes specific provisions in the
Charter of Human Rights41 and several directives, such as the Data
Protection Directive,42 the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications,43 and the Data Retention Directive.44 As a general
37

38

39
40
41

42

43

44

See, e.g., ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18, and nn. 44, 47, 51, 59,
and 61, (reserving the right to revisit elements of the draft later, but during the
negotiations).
See, e.g., id. art. 2.18 nn, 46, 50, 52, and 53. See also id. nn. 48 and 60 (defining
terms).
See, e.g., id art. 2.18 and nn. 43, 49, 54, 57, and 58.
See, e.g., id art. 2.18 and nn. 55 and 56.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7 and 8, 2000 O.J (C
364) 10.
Council Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
[hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37.
Directive 2006/24, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006
on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of
Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105)
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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principle, the processing of personal data requires the express consent of the
data subject, except for specific circumstances provided by domestic law,
and independent national authorities guarantee the enforcement of the law.
In February 2010, one month after a version of ACTA was leaked, the
European Data Protection Supervisor issued an opinion expressing his
concerns about potential incompatibility between envisaged ACTA
measures and the requirements of the EU‟s data protection law.45 The
Supervisor drew special attention to the provision dealing with the three
strikes policy and the transfer of personal data to third countries, other than
EU members, for purposes of intellectual property enforcement. Later, in
July 2010, the Data Protection Working Party (WP29), which meets the
national authorities on the matter, sent a public letter to the European
Commission.46 In its letter, the WP29 called attention to several of the
proposed measures of ACTA interfering with the right to privacy, and
called them into question for future negotiations. We will refer to the
concerns of the EU authorities through our analysis.
The following pages describe the provisions of ACTA related with
privacy and personal data, show how they connect with intellectual property
enforcement, and analyze how they challenge the legal regime in force in
countries that already have provided some protection to privacy and
personal data, particularly those that are involved in the ongoing
negotiations of the agreement.
A. ACTA Makes a Serious and Unprecedented Concession of Privacy and
Data Protection in favor of Intellectual Property Enforcement
As was mentioned, ACTA makes several direct and indirect references
to privacy and data protection, which are intended to balance them with
intellectual property enforcement, unlike other major international
instruments on intellectual property, which practically contain no mention
of privacy and data protection. The very mention of them could be
understood as an achievement for privacy advocates, because ACTA at least
recognizes the importance of privacy and data protection by adopting
specific norms that regulate its possible conflict with enforcing the

45

46

54 [hereinafter Data Retention Directive].
Opinions of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current Negotiations by
the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 2010 O.J. (C 147) 1.
Letter from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to the Commissioner, Mr.
Karel de Gucht, regarding the Data Protection and Privacy Implications of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement [ACTA] (July 15, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2010_07_15_letter_w
p_commissioner_de_gucht_acta_en.pdf.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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intellectual property law. However, in comparing ACTA with the TRIPS
Agreement, those references seem to be a mere concession in favor of the
enforcement.
In effect, the TRIPS Agreements recognize not only the relevant
international intellectual property agreements or conventions, but also the
applicability of the basic principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 1994 and, therefore, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, the multilateral treaties that set forth rules governing international
trade in services, which the World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces.
The latter includes a specific provision about general exceptions that allows
countries to adopt of measures inconsistent with the Agreement when those
measures are necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
related to the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the
processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of
confidentiality of individual records and accounts.47
The mentioned general exception allows countries to develop public
policies on several issues, without practical limitations, in fields such as
safety, protection of the environment, public morals, to maintain public
order, and personal data protection.48 ACTA, on the contrary, requires
countries to adopt given measures against the privacy and personal data
protection of the Internet users in order to enforce intellectual property laws.
In other words, while previous regulations safeguard the adoption of
measures to protect privacy and personal data by countries, the ACTA
provisions require the implementation of measures that negatively affect
that privacy and personal data protection.
According to a still draft provision of ACTA, nothing in the agreement
“shall require any party to disclose confidential information which would be
contrary to . . . right of privacy.”49 This provision seems to safeguard the
freedom of countries to provide an adequate level of protection for privacy
and data protection. However, the scope of this safeguard is not clear yet;
some countries wish to limit its effects to chapters about international
cooperation and enforcement practices, but not the chapter that creates a
47

48

49

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), art. XX; and, General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), art. XIV c) (ii).
See PETER SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 191 (1998)
(explaining limitations to the exception, none of them referred to intellectual property
enforcement). In fact, it abides by several tests set forth by Article XIV of the GATS
in order to prevent an abuse of the exceptions. See Council for Trade in Services,
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Progress Report to the General Council,
WTO document S/L/74 ¶ 14 (Jul. 27, 1999).
ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 4.3.2.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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legal framework for enforcing intellectual property rights, which contains
the riskiest provisions to privacy and personal data. In addition, this
provision protects privacy, but only under determined circumstances.50 As
a result of those limitations, the mentioned safeguard does not prevent
abuse in intellectual property enforcement or jeopardizing privacy and
personal data protection.
Only by the ninth round of negotiations, among the initial provisions,
was a second relevant safeguard proposed.51 It also would allow parties to
not disclose information related to privacy when that disclosure is “contrary
to its law or its international agreements [and it] would prejudice law
enforcement . . . or otherwise be contrary to public interest.”52 But, this
safeguard, which is still under consideration,53 has a broader scope than the
aforementioned, and seems more satisfactory for the purpose of preserving
and developing public policies consistent with the right to privacy in
domestic laws, especially in those countries that understand privacy and
data protection as issues of public interest, beyond the mere protection of
the person concerned by the information.
In sum, ACTA has made a serious and unprecedented concession of
privacy and data protection in favor of intellectual property enforcement by
depriving countries of the freedom to adopt laws related to protecting the
rights to privacy and personal data protection, and by requiring the
implementation of measures that negatively could affect those rights. In
other words, ACTA does not prevent the adoption of public policies on
privacy and data protection by countries, but certainly imposes some
conditions on them. Including a general safeguard in ACTA would help to
preserve and develop some adequate protection in domestic law; however, it
does not change that significant concession.
B. ACTA Still Omits Appropriate Safeguards for the Right to Privacy in
General.
As previously discussed, the current text of ACTA does not include any

50

51

52
53

Id. art. 4.3.2 (drafting a proposal that sets forth parties will be not required to disclose
information which would “impede the enforcement” of its laws and regulations,
including laws protecting the right to privacy. Therefore, any other case, parties shall
be required to).
See id. (expressing interest in including a general safeguard in favor of the right to
privacy by the 8th round of negotiation, which seems quite late, given the importance
of this right, particularly for the European Union).
Id. art. 1.4.
Id. n. 3 (mentioning that this provision is still subject to confirmation by the United
States and the New Zealand delegations).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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general provision that ensures that nothing in the agreement detracts from
domestic legislation regarding the protection of personal privacy. However,
as was mentioned, there is a proposal to include a provision with that
purpose,54 which unfortunately has not been confirmed by some negotiators
yet.55 This norm is essential, given the concession that ACTA has made
with privacy and data protection in favor of intellectual property
enforcement and the absence of appropriated limitations and safeguards in
other international instruments in both data protection and intellectual
property regulation.
It is possible to argue that other international instruments on human
rights already protect the right to privacy and the right to personal data
protection against a possible abusive enforcement of intellectual property
laws, but, unfortunately, those instruments have limited effects. Some of
them have limited personal effects, such as the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.56 Most of them are not legally binding57
and, therefore, almost impossible to enforce.58 Others could be legally
binding but have an extremely generic and ambiguous enunciation of those
rights.59 In some countries, like in the U.S., human rights in general have a
limited enforcement against the public sector, but not the private one.60
In sum, the international instruments on human rights still are
insufficient to provide adequate protection for the right to privacy and for
the right to protection of personal data against the threat posed by the level
of intellectual property enforcement encouraged by ACTA. In addition, no

54
55
56
57

58

59

60

Id. art. 1.4.
Id.
See Data Protection Directive, supra note 42.
See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Council (Sept. 23,
1980). See also United Nations Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data
Files, G.A. Res. 45/95, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/95 (Dec. 14, 1990); Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework, APEC XVI Ministerial Meeting,
November 17-18, 2004, available at
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%2803995EABC73F94816C2A
F4AA2645824B%29~APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+Framew
ork.pdf.
These instruments would only be enforceable if they become customary norms, which
seems difficult because they have been intended as a non-binding rules and mere
recommendation for parties, denying opinio juris, an essential element for customary
law.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. Charter (Jun. 26, 1945).
For a limited number of cases in which the U.S. accepts enforcement of human rights
against the private sector, see, e.g., The 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350
(1988); Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); and, the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codifying
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international instrument in either data protection or intellectual property
currently provides safeguards to reconcile the competing interests. For
those reasons, it seems indispensable to include, in the very text of ACTA, a
general provision to ensure that nothing in the agreement detracts from
domestic legislation regarding the protection of personal privacy.
C. ACTA Grants Access to Internet Users‟ Personal Information for
Intellectual Property Enforcement beyond Domestic Laws in Force
Enforcing the law in the digital environment to address individual
infringement requires the identification of infringers and, consequently, the
collaboration of the online service providers (OSP) with the right holders.
OSPs have been collecting and processing Internet users‟ personal data for a
long time, initially for pricing purposes,61 later by law in order to contribute
to criminal prosecution, especially with regard to so-called cyber crime.62
Knowing the IP address,63 and the date and time of connection, OSPs are
able to identify the connected computer. Once knowing the connected
computer, it is possible to correlate it with the Internet user‟s identity and
his physical address.64
Several provisions of ACTA persist in granting access to information
that allows identifying supposed intellectual property infringers: in relation
to civil enforcement in general,65 to border measures,66 and in enforcing the

61

62

63

64

65

Filartiga).
Before offering Internet service access on a flat rate basis, companies used a price
structure based in the amount of time of connection, a metered rate that depended on
processing some Internet users‟ personal data for pricing purposes.
See Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest 23.XI.2001 (ETS No. 185) (Nov. 23,
2001), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm
[hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime]; Susan W. Brenner, The Council of Europe‟s
Convention on Cybercrime, in CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED
ENVIRONMENT 207 (Balkin ed., 2007) (arguing that country parties of the Convention
have been unable to adopt even a common understanding on criminal prosecution; in
fact, the agreement is not self-executing, does not provide a model legislation, allows
reservation by parties, and fails to provide an adequate understanding of the privacy
rules on the matter).
An IP address is a number assigned to any device (computer) connected to the
Internet. Sometimes that number varies according to the time of connection and is
assigned on demand by the Internet service provider (dynamic IP address); in other
instances that number is permanently linked to a given device (permanent IP
addresses).
This tracking system allows the identification of computers rather than users. In fact,
in some cases it is necessary to adopt additional technical measures to identify a user,
such as in open network (e.g., universities use a user name and password, while
cybercafés use a register identifying users).
ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.4 (including a still in bracket
provisions by the eighth round, which makes reservation in favor of domestic laws
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law in digital environment.67 However, while in the first two cases,
negotiators have approved the inclusion of express safeguards related to
statutory provisions that regulate the processing of personal data and
privacy laws, that did not happen in the third case;68 instead, in this case, a
proposal emphasizes that parties shall enable right holders to
“expeditiously” obtain from OSPs the necessary information to identity the
subscriber that supposedly has infringed the law.69
Many countries already have laws that allow the copyright holder to
access such information from OSPs.70 However, the current text of ACTA
goes beyond any domestic law by adopting an extremely broad concept of
online service provider; by extending the scope of those provisions; and by
omitting mention of any safeguards.
The obligation to identify subscribers applies to any online service
provider, which is defined by the same ACTA provision in the following
terms:
a provider of online services or network access, or the
operators of facilities therefore, and includes an entity offering
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user‟s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.71
This definition is broader than those available in comparative law, since it
applies to any person, including physical persons, to any provider, even
those that only provide access, and, not only to Internet based providers, but
any online service.

66

67
68

69
70

71

that regulate processing of personal data).
Id. art. 2.13 (including an already approved reservation in favor of laws pertaining to
the privacy or confidentiality of information).
Id. art. 2.18.3 ter.
See id. According to the first leaked version, those safeguards, which appear
approved by the second leaked version, were promoted by the European Union and
Singapore, respectively.
See id.
This is not the case of all the countries involved in the ACTA negotiations. In fact,
Mexico does not have legal provisions related to liability of online service providers
for copyright infringement, neither notice-and-takedown procedures nor rules related
to identifying subscribers by online service providers for supposed copyright
infringement.
It seems parties agree on the definition of online service provider, since, with the
exception of a mere cosmetic Canadian proposal, no other proposal has been raised,
and there is no record of opposition by any other country in any version of the
agreement. See, e.g., ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, n. 48.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

16

Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights by Diminishing Privacy

In the U.S., procedures for taking down content and identifying users
are limited to a service provider that is an “entity,”72 that is, “an
organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that has a legal
identity apart from its members.”73 In other words, those procedures apply
only to legal persons, but not to physical persons or human beings. Instead,
according to ACTA, those provisions shall apply to any provider, which
“includes an entity.” Therefore, at least in the case of the U.S. and
countries that have adopted similar provisions to the DMCA in their
FTAs,74 ACTA extends the duties, obligations, and cost of intellectual
property enforcement not just to legal persons, but possibly to common
people.
In the U.S., according to the criterion of the Verizon case,75 the
procedures to identify subscribers set forth by the DMCA do not grant
access to information that allows identification of users by a mere access
provider.76 In the EU, the E-Commerce Directive, which regulates the
procedure to identify users, does not include mere providers of access, but
those that provide storage services.77 Instead, ACTA would extend the
obligation to identify users to firms that only provide access to networks in
their capacity as conduit because ACTA does not make any distinction
72
73
74

75
76

77

17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (2006).
BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
The U.S. has included similar provisions in the Free Trade Agreements successively
signed with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, Bahrain, Oman, Peru,
Colombia, and Panama. See United States Trade Representative,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.
RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Commentators agree that the Verizon case has been a triumph for privacy advocates,
but it has not seriously affected the copyright holders‟ policies because they still can
issue subpoenas, which are available to any litigant who wants to sue an unknown
defendant by filing against John Doe. This mechanism provides more substantive and
procedural protection for Internet users, but it is not enough to avoid misuse and
abuse of the procedure. As a result, according those commentators, even in the case
of OSPs that provide mere access, copyright owners still have legal tools against
infringers in the civil enforcement context. See Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon:
Applying the Subpoena Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 418,
422-426 (2004); Thomas P. Owen & A. Benjamin Katz, RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Services, Inc.: Peer-to-Peer Networking Renders Section 512(h) Subpoenas under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Obsolete, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 619, 632634 (2004).
Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 15.2, 2000 O.J. (L.178) 1. But see Case C557-07, Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) - LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von
Leistungsschutzrechte GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH (Feb. 19, 2009)
(deciding, in spite of the literal wording of the mentioned Directive, that the
obligation to identify users could be imposed on access providers, even when they do
no supply any other service).
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related to this obligation,78 as opposed to the notice-and-take-down
procedure,79 and to the kind of service provided by OSPs.80 Therefore, the
implementation of this obligation could require a modification to the
DMCA under U.S. law,81 domestic laws drafted according FTAs,82 and the
EU Directive on E-Commerce.
The definition of online service provider not only applies to any person
and provider, even those that only provide access, but also to any online
service, not only Internet based providers. Instead, the EU law limits the
collection of personal data generated or processed by “providers of publicly
available electronic communications services or of a public
communications network.”83 Therefore, ACTA could undermine this
standard, by applying the obligations to online service providers that are not
yet addressed in the current EU law, such as private network services.84
The obligation to identify subscribers set forth by ACTA has a broad
scope also. They seem not limited to copyright enforcement, but intellectual
property; additionally, they extend not only to piracy and counterfeiting, as
it was suggested by negotiating parties, but, also, to criminal and civil
enforcement of intellectual property rights in general.
By the ninth round of negotiations, it is still unclear whether the
obligation to identify subscribers applies only to copyright and related
rights or also to other intellectual property rights. While the specific
provision related to enforcement in the digital environment seems to limit
the scope to trademarks, copyright, and related rights,85 the whole section
refers to intellectual property rights, and some countries seem to be pushing
for such a broad approach.86 The latter could be especially problematic for
78

79

80
81
82

83
84

85
86

ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, arts. 2.18.3 ter and 2.18.3 quarter, and n.
48.
Id. art. 2.18.3. See also, ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 8 art. 2.18.3
(excluding from the notice and take down procedures those providers acting solely as
a conduit).
See supra note 71.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
This could be the case of Chile, which in May 2010 implemented the FTA signed
with the U.S., imposing the obligation to identify users on ISPs other than those that
provide mere access. See Ley 17.336 sobre Propiedad Intelectual, [Copyright Act], as
amended, Diario Oficial, 4 de Mayo de 2010 (Chile), arts. 5 y, 85 R, and 85 S.
Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 3.
Curiously, it is possible to appreciate a disagreement between those countries that
want to apply this section to “the Internet” (Mexico, Singapore, and the United States)
and those that want to extend the scope to “digital environment” (the European Union
and Switzerland), which are already the words in the provisional title of the whole
section. See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.1.
Id. art. 2.18.3 ter.
Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States support a
scope limited to trademark, copyright and related rights, while the European Union,
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the U.S., since the DMCA limits its provisions to enforce copyright and
related rights; therefore, a full compliance with that scope of the ACTA
provisions would force the adoption of legislative measures.
In addition to the fact that the scope of the obligation to identify
subscribers is still unclear, it is important to point out that they do not apply
only to serious crime, either counterfeit or piracy, but to any criminal
behavior. Going beyond its declared purposes, ACTA requires identifying
any infringer, even when the conduct is neither counterfeiting nor piracy.
Although ACTA recognizes some gradation among criminal conduct,87 for
purpose of identifying users, the agreement does not make any distinction
and seems to apply to any criminal activity. Given the initial purpose of the
agreement and the lack of consensus about what constitutes a criminal
offense,88 it seems necessary to introduce some gradation in the cases that
authorize OSPs to identify users by limiting that procedure to criminal
actions concerning counterfeiting and piracy.89
The obligation to identify subscribers in ACTA applies not only in
criminal enforcement, but also in civil enforcement.90 Neither the
provisions that grant access to subscriber information, nor those related to
the civil enforcement section of the agreement, which also apply to
enforcing the law in the digital environment,91 exclude the obligation to
identify Internet users from civil enforcement. This is a troublesome scope,
since most countries requires OSPs to retain traffic data for purposes of
criminal prosecution, especially in the cases of so-called cyber crime,92 but
such obligation does not apply to civil enforcement actions. The underlying
belief is that granting access to personal data of Internet users processed by
OSPs jeopardizes human rights and the essential values of a democratic
society, a risk that cannot be tolerated for mere civil enforcement of

87

88
89

90
91
92

Japan, and Switzerland a broader approach, which extends to all intellectual property
rights. Id. art. 2.18.1.
E.g., id. arts. 2.14.1 (referring to criminal offenses in “cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale”), 2.16.3
(mentioning “indictable offenses” and “serious offenses”), and 2.17 (referring to
“cases of significant public interest”). Also, see id. art. 2.X (providing an exception to
border measures in case of di minimis infringement, which is not the case for granting
access to personal data related to a supposed infringer).
Id. art. 2.14.1.
Id. nn. 20, 21, 23 and 24 (providing concepts for both counterfeit trademark goods
and pirated copyright goods, which, however, are considerable broad and require
some changes in order to rationalize the scope of the criminal enforcement provisions
yet).
Id. art. 2.18.1.
Id. art. 2.4.
See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 62, art. 14.
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intellectual property rights that, after all, according to the TRIPS
Agreement, are private rights.93
In the case of the EU, for example, the Data Retention Directive
requires providers to process subscribers‟ personal data for purpose of the
investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crime.94 However,
according to the decision of European Court of Justice in the Promusicae
case.95 Community law does not set forth a specific obligation upon EU
members to guarantee access to Internet users‟ personal data to copyright
holder in civil enforcement actions, but Community law does allow the
adoption of this kind of measure in the domestic law.96 In sum, for the EU,
although it would be permitted by Community law, ACTA would require
adopting a law that obliges providers to identify subscribers for purposes of
civil enforcement.97
In sum, ACTA would grant access to the personal information of
subscribers held by providers for intellectual property enforcement beyond
the domestic laws in force. According to the initial purposes of ACTA, it is
recommended to expressly limit the scope of such access to information, for
example, by limiting that access to cases of criminal actions in counterfeit
and piracy and, therefore, excluding civil enforcement actions.
D. ACTA omits appropriate safeguards for the right to personal data
protection in providing access to personal information of Internet users.
As was previously mentioned, ACTA grants access to Internet users‟
personal information for purposes of intellectual property enforcement.
However, ACTA fails to provide enough measures to protect the rights of
concerned people from an abusive use of that access mechanism. On the
contrary, ACTA seems to privilege expeditious access to data, without

93
94
95

96

97

See supra note 35.
Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 1.
ECJ Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008).
Contra Ramón Casas Vallés, A la Caza del Pirata P2P: El Necesario Equilibrio
entre el Derecho de Autor y el Derecho a la Protección de la Intimidad, WIPO
MAGAZINE (Spanish version), April 2008, at 10-11 (suggesting that the message of
ECJ is that the EU members are not required to impose such kind of obligation in
civil procedures, but it is recommended). But see, Ramón Casas Vallés, Pursuing the
P2P Pirates: Balancing Copyright and Privacy Rights, WIPO MAGAZINE (English
version), April 2008, at 10-11 (providing a right understanding of the implications of
Promusicae case).
See also supra note 46 (calling the attention of the WP29 about the different scope of
the ACTA provisions and the European Union law).
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mentioning either substantive or procedural safeguards.98
Negotiators recently have included an article in ACTA that safeguards
domestic privacy laws. However, that general statement is insufficient to
protect privacy and personal data processing properly in the context of
intellectual property enforcement online. Specifically, ACTA fails to
provide any provisions that set forth how much time OSPs should keep
subscribers‟ personal data, procedures that properly guarantee the rights of
concerned subscribers, or even which data should be kept.99 It also has
been noted by the EU authorities100 that ACTA does not adopt any temporal
limitation for the processing of personal data by Internet service providers,
which is another possible conflict with EU law.101
The absence of appropriate safeguards is contrary to the high standards
of protection adopted by the EU, and even the minimal formal requirements
provided by the DMCA in the U.S. In the EU, according to the European
Court of Justice, members that wish to implement into domestic law a
mechanism to identify Internet users must balance fundamental rights, and
national authorities must interpret their domestic laws in a manner
consistent with fundamental rights, and with the other general principles of
Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.102 In the U.S.,
even the most expeditious procedure to identify a supposed infringer
provided by the DMCA has some minimal required showings,103 which
basically require filing a couple of documents.104 Even these minimal
safeguards are absent in ACTA.
Added to the lack of harmonization between ACTA provisions and both
the EU and the U.S. domestic laws, the absence of explicit safeguards in the
agreement can become a serious problem in its own implementation,
particularly for those countries lacking adequate technical assistance. It is a
well-known fact that some countries implement their international
commitments, especially with regard to technical issues, in a word-by-word
legal fashion. For that reason, it is recommended to include some specific

98
99

100
101
102

103

104

ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18. 3 ter.
Some of those safeguards (and useful boundaries) are usual in other instruments,
particularly in the European Union law. See, e.g., Data Retention Directive, supra
note 44; see also Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 62.
See supra note 46.
Data Retention Directive, supra note 44, art. 6.
See ECJ Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v.
Telefónica de España SAU (Jan. 29, 2008).
See Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright & Privacy – Through the Privacy Lens, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 273 et seq. (2005) (arguing that the relevant
DMCA‟s provisions are excessively permissive and threats seriously the privacy); See
also Owen & Katz, supra note 76, at 620; and, Kao, supra note 76, at 410.
17 U.S.C. §512(h)(2) (2006).
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provisions in ACTA that give a common level of protection for the rights to
privacy and personal data. In this point, following the aforementioned
criteria of the European Court of Justice seems to be the most appropriate
decision.
E. ACTA Provides Legal Support for Implementing the Polemical Three
Strikes Policy, a Measure that Raises Several Concerns from a Human
Rights Perspective.
The three strikes policy, also known as the graduated response, is a
measure of domestic law that allows the disconnection of a supposed
infringing Internet user for a given period of time, after the user has
received warning with successive notices about copyright infringements
committed through his or her Internet account. At the time this paper was
written, only a handful of countries had passed laws adopting three strikes
provisions, including France,105 South Korea,106 Taiwan,107 the United
Kingdom,108 and New Zealand.109
The French three strikes law was introduced by Sarkozy‟s government,
and it is probably the most illustrative case about how polemical this policy
can be. The bill generated serious concerns in the French data protection
authority related to the protection of Internet users‟ personal data.110 Later,
once adopted by the legislature, the law was declared unconstitutional by
the Constitutional Council111 because it infringed the right to due process of
law by allowing an administrative authority to impose sanctions,112 by105

106
107
108
109

110

111

112

Bill to support the diffusion and protection of content on the Internet, also known as
HADOPI Act, because the acronym of the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des
Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet, the name of the administrative agency
that supervises its compliance.
Art. 133 bis, South Korean Copyright Act, modified in April 2009.
Art. 90 quinquies, Taiwanese Copyright Act, modified in May 2009.
Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (Eng.).
The Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act, adopted in April 2008,
modified the copyright law by adopting a three strikes provision, which was later
modified by the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill, 2010.
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés, Délibération no. 2008-101 du
29 avril 2008 portant avis sur le projet de loi relatif à la Haute Autorité pour la
diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur Internet (avis no. 08008030),
published unofficially as La Loi Antipiratage: le Gouvernement Critiqué par la CNIL,
published in La Tribune, 3 November 2008, available at
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises/communication/telecom-internet/20081103trib000305843/loi-antipiratage-le-gouvernement-critique-par-lacnil-.html (last visited: August 30, 2010).
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council], decision no. 2009-580, Jun. 10,
2009.
Id. ¶ 16.
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passing the presumption of innocence by requiring the subscriber to prove
he or she has not committed an infringement,113 and the right of free speech
because “in the current state of affairs . . . the participation in democratic
life and expression of ideas and opinions includes the freedom to access to
those services (Internet).”114 Eventually, the unconstitutionality was
remedied by the French Parliament, which empowered courts to disconnect
Internet users.115 However, after one year in force, no one has been warned
of infringement nor disconnected; as Jérémie Zimmermann, the
spokesperson of La Quadrature du Net, a French advocacy group that
promotes rights and freedoms on the Internet, said, the law has created a
“big tax-sponsored spam machine.”116
The French three strikes law also affected the communitarian level. In
fact, Sarkozy‟s initiative created a conflict between the European
Commission, then under the presidency of the French government, and the
European Parliament in the context of the adoption of the Telecom Package.
The conflict eventually was solved by adopting an amendment resisted by
Sarkozy‟s government, which requires that “measures taken by countries
regarding end-users' access . . . shall respect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general
principles of community law.”117
The leaked versions of ACTA included an explicit mention of the three
strikes laws in footnotes, as an example of a policy to address the
unauthorized storage or transmission of materials protected by copyright or
related rights that could be adopted and reasonably implemented by OSPs in
order to qualify for the limitation of liability related to online material.118
The content of that footnote has been deleted in the official version of
ACTA, but ACTA still keeps provisions to support the three strikes policy.
Therefore, with or without explicit mention in footnotes, even when ACTA
does not require the adoption of three strikes laws, it provides legal support
for implementing this polemical measure.
113

114
115

116

117
118

Id. ¶ 17. Interestingly, this is a common feature of all the three strikes laws already
adopted: the user is presumed guilty in advance and, therefore, she must probe being
innocent, in spite of her technical limitations.
Id. ¶ 12.
Assemblée Nationale, Projet de Loi relatif à la protection pénale de la propriété
littéraire et artistique sur Internet (Sept. 22, 2009).
Hadopi is dead: "three strikes" buried by highest court, La Quadrature (Paris), Jun.
10, 2009, http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/hadopi-is-dead-three-strikes-killed-byhighest-court.
Council Directive 2009/140, art. 1 (1) (b), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37.
See ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 8, n. 29; See also European Union
Directorate-General For Trade, ACTA Negotiations (Sept. 30, 2009), Ref. 588/09.
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In addition to human rights concerns, disconnecting Internet users, as
ACTA suggests, should be especially cumbersome for countries that
already have recognized the rights to access to Internet and/or to
broadband.119 But it is not just the sanction of disconnection itself that
causes concern, but also the lack of substantive and procedural safeguards
for supposed infringers. For example, ACTA does not impose a general
monitoring requirement on OSPs,120 but the very implementation of a three
strikes provision requires some processing of personal data without
authorization of the data subject; again, ACTA fails in providing a
minimum legal framework for such data processing. In this point, given
that the appropriate operation of a three strikes policy requires identifying a
supposed infringer, all the comments made previously are also valid here.
The European authorities on data protection have analyzed the ACTA
provisions on three strikes and their negative effects on the right to privacy.
According to the European Data Protection Supervisor and the WP29,121 the
current text of ACTA at the very least encourages the implementation of the
controversial three strikes policy. They argued that the agreement should
include some “minimum standards for the enforcement,” and called to
attention that large scale monitoring or systematic recording of data would
be contrary to the EU law.
Any explicit reference to the three strikes policy should be avoid in
ACTA because it could be used as a argument to force countries to
implement such a polemical measure. Otherwise, given its intrinsic
punitive nature, the three strikes policy should be brought into compliance
with the basic principles of criminal and human rights law, such as nullum
poena sine legem (principle of legality), non bis in idem (prohibition of
double incrimination), the presumption of innocence, and the due process of
law. Therefore, similar to what the French Constitutional Council and the
Telecom Package have done,122 a direct or indirect reference to such policy
should be mitigated with express allusion to substantive and procedural
safeguards with respect to the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons.

119

120
121
122

See Finland makes broadband a „legal right,‟BBC (London), Jul. 1, 2010, available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10461048 (last visited: August 30, 2010) (reporting
that Finland recently has become the first one to recognize access to the Internet as a
legal right).
ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.3 bis.
See supra notes 45 & 46.
See supra notes 111 &117.
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F. ACTA promotes cooperation between rights holders and ISPs without
regard for the rights of third parties, like the right to privacy and
protection of personal data of customers.
A still unapproved article of ACTA requires parties to promote the
development of mutually supportive relationships between OSPs and rights
holders to deal with intellectual property infringement online, including
encouraging the establishment of guidelines.123 In this context, promoting
self-regulation seems an adequate manner to deal with the continuous
changes and challenges of the technological environment, and with the
usual delay of legal solutions. However, again ACTA fails in not providing
any safeguards for the right of third parties, particularly the Internet endusers.
It is important to note here that the self-regulatory approach has been
used in some countries, such as the United Kingdom124 and Ireland,125 to
promote the adoption of three strikes policies by the OSPs. Under pressure
from copyright holders and with the implicit agreement of governments,
OSPs have modified their contracts with subscribers to include clauses that
legitimate the disconnection of users for supposed copyright infringements.
Unfortunately, this self-regulation has not protected customers‟ rights
appropriately. ACTA should take advantage of these experiences and
include safeguards against abusive self-regulatory practices.
G. ACTA Emphasizes the Protection of Effective Technological Measures,
but Still Does Not Afford Protection for the Privacy and Personal Data
of Users Affected by Such Measures.
The ACTA negotiators have provided a significant increase in the legal
protection of the effective technological measures beyond the standard
adopted in the WIPO Internet Treaties.126 Before the public official release
of ACTA, it required not only adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies, but also civil remedies or criminal penalties,127 an excess that
123
124

125

126

ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 8, art. 2.18.3 quater.
See Eleanor Dallaway, Music Piracy Born Out of a „Something for Nothing‟ Society,
INFOSECURITY 17-20 (Apr. 2008); Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What‟s
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does not appear in the current draft of ACTA. But, ACTA still requires the
adoption of those remedies independent of any infringement of copyright or
related rights.128 Also, similar to the DMCA,129 ACTA still requires
adopting anti-circumventing and anti-trafficking provisions,130 the latter of
which implies serious difficulties in making real the possible safeguards
that a country “may” adopt in benefits of certain exceptions and limitations
to copyright and related rights.131 Unfortunately, unlike the DMCA and the
FTAs signed by the U.S. with several countries, ACTA does not provide
even a minimum list of those exceptions.
Analyzing the provisions about legal protection of the effective
technological measures is beyond the purpose of this paper. However, it is
appropriate to mention that those provisions again fail in including any
limitation that guarantees the adequate protection of the rights to privacy
and personal data protection. Including a provision that provides safeguards
for those rights is necessary insofar as the technological measures require
personal data of people who use or access to the protected works.
H. ACTA omits provisions to safeguard the protection of personal data in
cross-border transferences of such data.
The whole purpose of getting compliance with intellectual property
rules and enforcing them requires, to some extent, interchanging personal
information among parties, such as copyright holder and supposed
infringers‟ data. This is especially true in the case of online infringements;
overcoming the limitations of territorial-based domestic laws demands a
global answer, which calls for international cooperation in the enforcement
of the law. In the case of ACTA, it sets forth that countries that adhere to
the agreement shall share relevant information132 and adopt some
enforcement practices.133
Unfortunately, there is no provision that
safeguards that an adequate level of protection shall be provided to the
personal data that is transferred from one country to another. In other
words, ACTA forgets the existence of rules that regulate the cross-border
transference of personal data.
Several countries already have personal data protection laws, which
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balance the protection of people‟s privacy with the free flow of information.
However, as it was understood early on by the European countries, the very
purpose of having strong domestic protection could be eroded if personal
data is transferred to countries with no protection; cross-border
transferences of personal data to places where there is not an adequate level
of protection circumvents the objective of data privacy laws. Therefore, it
is necessary to adopt some limitations to those transfers, which
unfortunately ACTA does not do.
It is not by chance that the European Data Protection Supervisor has
raised the lack of provisions on cross-border transfers of personal data in
ACTA.134 There have been some attempts to regulate those transfers in
international fora through legal harmonization, but their successes, if they
exist, have been limited.135 But, this has not been the case of the EU. Since
the early „80s,136 the EU has built an increasing level of protection for
personal data in its internal market, which has been catapulted through the
adoption of several directives on the matter.137 Basically, this legal
framework assumes an “equivalent” level of protection among the EU
members, which cannot block transfers in the internal market;138 and,
requires an “adequate” level of protection to third countries in order to
authorize transfers of data to them.139 Therefore, apart from some limited
exceptions,140 transferring personal data to third countries that do not
provide adequate level of protection, which is the case of all the countries
involved in the ACTA negotiations, is banned.
It seems that the ACTA negotiators have avoided acknowledging the
fact that a satisfactory solution for transferences of personal data is required
for intellectual property enforcement in the agreement. This is hardly a
small point, especially for the European authorities that are more concerned
with the protection of European citizens, and particularly their right to
privacy. In fact, two of the main political conflicts between the European
Parliament and the European Commission, which is negotiating ACTA,
have been the result of the most sympathetic engagement of the former than
the latter in protecting the right to privacy: first, when the Parliament
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rejected the agreement between the Commission and the U.S. to transfer
personal data of air passengers; later, when the Parliament adopted a
provision against the three strike policy in the Telecom Package against the
Commission‟s desires. These facts show that privacy is a serious issue for
European authorities, which ACTA negotiators have not weighed properly.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
Authorizing any intrusion into the privacy and personal data protection
of Internet users under the guise of intellectual property enforcement is
disproportionate, and allows an excessive misuse and abuse of disclosed
information, which jeopardizes not just the right to privacy, but also an
essential requirement for a democratic society. But, at the same time,
denying access to information that is required to identify an infringer,
particularly the author of a serious infringement, is excessive. ACTA has
had to balance the competing interests in this dilemma: the rights to privacy
and the protection of personal data with intellectual property rights.
The concessions of ACTA in privacy exceed the very purpose of the
treaty, which pretends to be limited to fighting counterfeiting and piracy,
but instead it includes provisions intended to enforce the law against
citizens. Those serious and unprecedented concessions omit appropriate
substantive and procedural safeguards for the right to privacy of Internet
users. Instead of limiting the access to personal data to serious crimes,
ACTA grants access to personal information beyond domestic laws in force.
Even other international instruments that have been criticized seriously for
being intrusive on privacy, such as the Convention on Cybercrime and the
FTAs, seem more protective on the matter.
In addition, ACTA provides legal support for implementing the
polemical three strikes policy, a measure that raises several concerns from a
human rights perspective, and promotes cooperation between right holders
and ISPs without regard to the rights of third parties, such as the right to
privacy and protection of personal data of customers. The same can be said
about the provisions related to the protection of effective technological
measures, which do not afford any protection for the privacy and personal
data of users affected by them.
An additional serious problem arises in the harmonization of the
provisions of ACTA, which implicitly allow transferences of personal
information among the parties, and the EU requirements for trans-border
flow of personal data. Currently, none of the negotiating parties satisfy the
EU “adequate” level of protection to allow transferences of personal data;
therefore, national and communitarian authorities on data protection in the
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EU could block any transference of such data for intellectual property
enforcement. And, even worse for the intentions of negotiators, it can
become an obstacle for the adoption of ACTA by the European Parliament.
ACTA fails not only in providing adequate protection for the rights to
privacy and the protection of personal data, but also in addressing its very
purpose, in providing a harmonizing international instrument to fight
against counterfeiting and piracy. For example, ACTA attempts to enforce
any use of a copyrighted work in the digital environment, without affording
the recognized problem of lack of harmonization in either limitation or
exception to intellectual property rights and the exhaustion of those rights.
Intellectual property rights are essentially private rights and hardly can
override the rights to privacy and personal data protection, which have an
intrinsic social value, particularly in democratic societies. Hardly, but not
impossibly. Unfortunately, ACTA makes mistakes when it overrides its
own purpose, by unnecessary diminishing the right to privacy and the right
to protection of personal data, to provide enforcement not against smugglers
and pirates, but against ordinary citizens.
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